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Abstract
I used observational data from natural encounters with predators and the controlled pre-
sentation of aerial and terrestrial predator alarm calls to assess the hypothesis that these
acoustically discernable calls trigger context- and predator-appropriate behaviour in free-
ranging vervet monkeys (Chlorocebus pygerythrus). my results, from two study groups in
South Africa, show that the modal natural and experimental response was not to initiate
escape behaviour, either immediately or in the 10s following an alarm call, but to look at
the sound source. When monkeys did take evasive action, which occurred no more fre-
quently than doing nothing at all, contextually- inappropriate behaviour (i.e., behaviour
that was not appropriate for evading the specific predator type) was as likely to occur as
contextually-appropriate behaviour. I also found that the distance at which calls were heard
was negatively correlated with the probability of some form of evasive action. I suggest that
the large size of our groups, and the consequently greater mean distance at which natural
calls were heard, may explain why our animals displayed low levels of active response and
less predator-appropriate evasion or vigilance than expected, given previous work on this
species (Seyfarth et al. 1980. Science, 210, 801-803). As the frequency and rapidity with
which respondents looked towards the loudspeaker confirmed the general salience of the
calls, I conclude that the broader social and ecological framework in which calls occur,
rather than a simple contextually regular linkage between call types and specific predators,
shapes animals responses to calls in this species.
iii
Acknowledgments
The employees of Samara Game Reserve and the owners Mark and Sarah Tompkins made
this project possible through logistical assistance and access to Samara Game Reserve.
Our amazing neighbours: Pokie, Jeanette and Emmanuel who made living at Samara a
fun and rewarding experience. Hayley Clements, Alwyn Lubbe and the volunteer program
for teaching us much about the field site in South Africa. Alwyn was especially helpful
with the monkeys and identifying the plant species that were a part of our monthly plant
survey. Richard MacFarland for supervising the project and helping me construct some of
the procedures used in the playback trials of my experiment.
In Lethbridge, I would like to thank my advisors for not only providing me with this
excellent experience to work in the field for a year in South Arica but also for all the
assistance with my paper that we worked on this summer. Probably my biggest thanks
goes to my peers, who I am also lucky to call my friends. Brittany Thomas, my field
buddy and roommate whom I shared a lot of adventures with over the two year span of
my masters. Thank you Alena and Eric Matlock who not only were a big help in video
recording monkeys for me but were great friends to have in the field and at braais. Thank
you to Jessica Parker and Thomas Rutherford for training me on the monkey ID’s and
Jessica Sashaw for coming out to help with ID’s as well. In the field, we had a pretty
intense year working through our projects and I couldn’t have come this far without the
good and crazy experiences we all shared. Thank you to my fellow masters students in
other departments, Nicole Netelenbos and Sheila Macdonald for being there during the
good and tough parts of our masters thesis. Pulling all nighters will not be the same without
you Nicole.
iv
Contents
Approval/Signature Page ii
Dedication iii
Abstract iii
Preface iv
Acknowledgments iv
Table of Contents v
List of Tables vii
List of Figures ix
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Selective Forces for Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2 Overview Of The Field 6
2.1 Selective Forces for Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2 Historical Theories of Communication in Non-Human Animals . . . . . . . 8
2.2.1 Early Ethological Theories in Animal Communication . . . . . . . 8
2.2.2 Structure and Function of Animal Communication . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3 Informational Theories of Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.4 Influence over information: The affect-induction approach . . . . . . . . . 19
2.5 History of playback experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3 Methods 26
3.1 Study Animals and Site . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.2 Observational data collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.3 Recording of vocalizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.4 Experimental procedure and analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.5 Data extraction from videotaped responses to experimental calls . . . . . . 31
3.6 Statistical Analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4 Results 33
4.1 First responses to natural predator alarm calls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.2 First responses to predator alarm call playback trials . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.3 Comparison of first responses to natural and experimental alarm calls . . . 36
4.4 Comparison of responses produced during the 10s following a call . . . . . 37
4.5 Startle responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
v
5 Discussion 43
Bibliography 50
References 50
vi
List of Tables
3.1 The frequency with which vervet monkeys responded with either appropri-
ate (N = 22) or inappropriate (N = 18) predator-avoidance behaviour in the
10s following the experimental presentation of an alarm call. The number
of animals that did not produce predator-avoidance behaviour (N = 114) is
also indicated. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.2 Number of times an individuals playback was used (number of alarm calls
that were re-used in a second playback.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.3 Sex/Age of respondents to calls during playback trials and calls occurring
naturally. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.1 The responses of subjects to natural aerial (NRespondents = 70) and land (NRespondents
= 66) predator alarm calls, followed by responses to playbacks of aerial
(NRespondents = 58) and land (NRespondent = 96) predator calls. Responses that
were neither appropriate nor inappropriate according to the criteria were
distinguished by whether the respondent did or did not look towards the
sound source. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.2 Mixed logistic regression model of (A) the probability that appropriate
predator-avoidance responses and (B) the probability that any defined predator-
avoidance behaviour were the first response to natural alarm calls. Troop
identity was entered as an independent variable and Distance as a covariate.
Individual identity was entered as a random factor. b+/-SE are coefficients
and their associated SEs in logits. 95% confidence intervals (CI) are de-
rived from transformed odds-ratios. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.3 Mixed logistic regression model of (A) the probability that appropriate
predator-avoidance responses and (B) the probability that any defined predator-
avoidance behaviour were the first response to experimental alarm calls.
Troop identity was entered as an independent variable and Distance as a
covariate. Individual identity was entered as a random factor. b+/-SE are
coefficients and their associated SEs in logits. 95% confidence intervals
(CI) are derived from transformed odds-ratios. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.4 Mixed logistic regression model of the probability that Response type (predator-
avoidance, look towards call source and no apparent response) differed
across Call contexts (natural, experimental). The Distance of respondents
to the call, Age/Sex class of respondents (Adult male, Adult female, Juve-
nile) and Troop identity were included to control for any general influence
across Call context. The interaction between Distance and Response type
was included to control for the volume at which experimental calls were
played. b+/-SE are coefficients and their associated SEs in logits. 95%
confidence intervals (CI) are derived from transformed odds-ratios. Indi-
vidual identity was entered as a random factor. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
vii
4.5 Mixed linear regression model of the probability that the time of onset of
a response to the presentation of an alarm call was a function of Troop,
Distance from the speaker and Response type (control, predator-avoidance
behaviour, look at speaker with startle, look at speaker without startle).
b+/-SE are coefficients and their associated SEs in logits. 95% confidence
intervals (CI) are derived from transformed odds-ratios. Individual identity
was entered as a random factor. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
viii
List of Figures
4.1 The relative frequency with which the first response of vervet monkeys to
natural (Grey bars. N = 136 animals) or experimentally-produced (Black
bars. N = 154 animals) alarm calls was i. predator avoidance, ii. an absence
of any detectable behaviour or, iii. a stare in the direction of the sound source. 38
4.2 The onset time (least square mean in seconds +/- 95%CI) of the first re-
actions of vervet monkeys to those experimental presentation of alarm and
control calls for which a response was detected. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
5.1 A group of nine vervet monkeys (A) at the moment that the call is presented
to them from a distance of 29m and (b) 300ms later. Interlacing is visible
in B because images were extracted from a digital video recording. . . . . . 46
ix
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Selective Forces for Communication
Studies of animal communication have made extensive use of the concept of information,
particularly in the realm of vocalizations (see e.g., Hauser (1996); Rendall, Owren, and
Ryan (2009); Bradbury and Vehrencamp (2011); Seyfarth and Cheney (2013)). In some in-
stances, such as the early classic studies of primate alarm calling, it was suggested that this
information was semantic, and that calls were referential (i.e., they pointed to an external
referent, and not merely the animals internal state), with a somewhat arbitrary, word-like
structure (Seyfarth, Cheney, & Marler, 1980a, 1980b). An alternative view, put forward
around the same time, was that the acoustic structure of calls produced by birds and mam-
mals reflected a more general relationship between the structure of sounds and the moti-
vation underlying their use with, for example, aggressive contexts tending to be associated
with harsh, low-frequency sounds (Morton, 1977; Owings & Morton, 1998).
As studies accumulated, particularly on the primates, it became apparent that the struc-
ture of calls was not as arbitrary as initially thought, but rather showed evidence of the
kinds motivation-structural rules suggested by (Morton, 1977). For review see Wheeler
and Fischer (2012). Call production was also shown to be rather inflexible, which further
called into question the idea that vocal signals were conventional in the linguistic sense
(Wheeler & Fischer, 2012). As a result, there was a shift in terminology: calls were now
considered to be functionally referential (Marler, Evans, & Hauser, 1992). That is, they
functioned as if they possessed meaning or contained information for perceivers, but with
no claims made as to the nature of semantic content, nor any requirement to specify the
precise nature of the psychological mechanisms underpinning the perceivers responses. In-
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stead, functional reference required only that a call was reliably elicited by a particular class
of stimuli (context specificity), and that such calls reliably led to a response that was adap-
tive for a given stimulus, even when the stimulus was not present (stimulus independence)
(Scarantino, 2010; Wheeler & Fischer, 2012). This notion of functional reference has since
been applied widely across both mammalian and avian species (Wheeler & Fischer, 2012).
Some authors have criticized the idea of functional reference, however, on both con-
ceptual and empirical grounds (e.g. Owren and Rendall (2001); Rendall et al. (2009)).
Specifically, these authors reject the information concept, arguing that the loose, metaphor-
ical way in which the term is used leads to information being conflated with linguistic
notions of meaning (i.e., the idea that calls possess inherent content). As an alternative to
functional reference, Owren and Rendall (2001) proposed an affect conditioning or affect
induction model that eliminated any reference to language-like metaphors. In this view,
which draws on Morton (1977) early work, and Owings and Morton (1998) subsequent
assessment-management approach to animal vocal communication, classical conditioning
leads animals to associate particular calls with particular contexts, without any requirement
for information or semantic meaning to be conveyed by the call itself. Rather, the acoustic
structure of the call serves to alert perceivers to the situation, by tapping directly into low-
level perceptual, attentional and motivational processes, and animals then learn that these
inherently arousing calls predict a particular sequence of events (Owren & Rendall, 2001).
As Scarantino (2010) has argued, however, it remains possible to distinguish carefully
between natural meaning (i.e., instances where calls are associated with an external ref-
erent) and non-natural meaning (i.e., the idea that the calls themselves contain semantic
content) and so continue to use the information concept in a rigorous and non-linguistic
fashion (see also Wheeler and Fischer (2012)). Put simply, it is the context-specific nature
of the calls that is most relevant to understanding how calls function, and not the potential
referential content of the calls themselves. Understanding how perceiver responses vary
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with context thus enables an assessment of how informative calls are, but does not require
that calls themselves contain information.
One of the striking features of the debate regarding the referential nature of primate vo-
calizations is how much rests on the original example of the vervet monkey alarm-calling
system. As first noted by (Struhsaker, 1967a), vervet monkeys (Chlorocebus pygerythrus)
give acoustically distinct alarm calls to each of three predator classes. The adaptive re-
sponses shown to experimental playbacks of these calls in the absence of the predator
(Seyfarth et al., 1980a, 1980b; Cheney & Seyfarth, 1992), made them the paradigmatic ex-
ample of functional reference in non-linguistic organisms (Wheeler & Fischer, 2012). In-
terestingly, given its canonical importance and the extensive research on other taxa that the
original study inspired (e.g., Beynon and Rasa (1989); Evans, Evans, and Marler (1993);
Zuberbu¨hler (2000)), this work has not been replicated in vervets themselves, although a
recent study on the closely-related green monkey (Ch. Sabaeus) has dealt with some of
the issues that arise from the original work (Price & Fischer, 2013). Besides the intrinsic
importance of replication (Kelly, 2006), it is also worth re-visiting the vervet case to ex-
plore more fully the extent to which contextual factors might influence the response shown
to predator calls, as Scarantino (2010) and Wheeler and Fischer (2012) suggest. It also
provides an opportunity to look for evidence that calls might induce certain kinds of affect
and hence influence a perceivers response.
I have been working on a population of vervet monkeys at Samara Game Reserve in
South Africa that matches, in most respects, the historical population in Amboseli, Kenya,
where the original alarm call work was done. It is the same species (Ch. pygerythrus),
(although new classification now places this in a different sub-species, Ch. p. pygerythrus,
versus Ch.p. hilgerti in Kenya) with a similar population density, ecology and activity
schedule (Pasternak et al., 2012). My population also experiences levels of predation at
least as high as Amboseli although, in the absence of large constricting snakes, only from
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terrestrial (caracal, Caracal caracal; black-backed jackal, Canis mesomelas) and aerial
(Verreauxs eagle: Aquila verreauxii; giant eagle-owl: Bubo lacteus) predators (Pasternak,
2011). I have observed predation by, and alarm calls to, all identified predators and the
decline in troop size across the study period confirms the importance of predation (see
below). Like leopards, caracal and jackal hunt by stalking and pouncing, while eagles at
my site ambush their prey without landing, and then take flight with it (pers. obs.). As
these predatory tactics are similar to those observed at Amboseli, I feel confident that I can
discount the possibility that differences in predator behaviour will be responsible for any
observed differences in the vervets response.
There is, however, an appreciable difference between the two populations in relation
to group size: riverine groups at Samara are of the order of ⇠40 animals, which is almost
twice the size of those at Amboseli (Pasternak et al., 2012). As a result, group members
at Samara also tend to be more widely spaced for most of the day. It is widely accepted
that group size is central to predation risk, both because of its consequences for the proba-
bility of being attacked (Hamilton, 1971) and the likelihood of predator detection through
vigilance (Elgar, 1989), with larger groups assumed to provide greater protection to their
members via both dilution and detection. As Wheeler (2010a, 2010b) has suggested, it
also seems reasonable to suppose that larger group sizes will result in a greater average
distance between callers and perceivers, and hence an increased probability that perceivers
will be also be further away from predators on average, given the range at which predators
usually attack. Call distance (which would be perceived as differences in call amplitude)
should therefore influence the likelihood that animals will take evasive action. Although
(Seyfarth et al., 1980b), found that call amplitude had no effect on vervets responses at
Amboseli, their groups were small and subjects were relatively close to the loudspeaker
⇠15m. Given these differences in group size, and hence social context, it is informative to
explore whether the Samara vervets display the same responses to predator calls as those
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at Amboseli, and consider factors that may modulate the relationship between call and
response.
Accordingly, I use both observational data on responses to the calls given both to natural
predators and those produced during alarm call playback experiments to test the following
predictions: (i) If alarm calls serve primarily to identify particular predator classes, the first
response to a call should be either context-appropriate predator avoidance behaviour or
context-appropriate visual scanning. (ii) If alarm calls show stimulus independence, then
there should be no significant difference in the responses produced to natural calls (i.e.,
when a predator is present) versus experimental calls (i.e., when the predator is absent).
(iii) Alternatively, in the absence of direct visual evidence of a predator, animals may look
more frequently toward the caller as a means to gain further contextual information (iv)
Contextual changes, specifically distance of perceivers from the sound source, will lead to
reduced rates of responding as distance from the caller/playback increases. Finally, I take
a first step toward testing the affect-induction model, testing the prediction that (v) Alarm
calls should be associated with reflexive startle responses by perceivers due to the sudden
onset and plosive quality of the calls (Owren & Rendall, 2001).
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Chapter 2
Overview Of The Field
2.1 Selective Forces for Communication
Communication is debatably one of the most challenging constructs to investigate, regard-
less of the discipline or approach. Defining communication is difficult because there is no
universal design or communication system in the animal kingdom; all social animals, in
some way, differ in how they communicate with each member of their own species. What
is evident in the study of animal communication is that communication requires the inter-
action of at least two members of the same species. In fact, social groups would not exist
without communication between members of each particular group. Thus, for communi-
cation to be selected for, group living and interaction with others members must have also
been selected for as well.
It often appears that group interaction requires altruistic behaviours that reduces indi-
vidual fitness for overall group fitness (Trivers, 1971). However, this opposes evolution-
ary principles that suggest individuals behave to enhance overall fitness for themselves
(Dawkins, 2006). Furthermore, group living has many consequences for the individual
within the group, such as increased competition for resources and, if not cryptic, increased
susceptibility to predation encounters (Hill & Dunbar, 1998). However, social groups are
in high abundance today, therefore for many animals, selective forces must have favored
individuals to band together and form social groups. To understand animal communication,
determining what kind of circumstance(s) would favor group living is the first problem that
must be addressed. Predation has been suggested as a primary force that favored group
living (Alexander, 1974). It is hypothesized that frequent encounters with predators may
have been the big factor that promoted individuals to live cooperative, social lifestyles. Hill
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and Lee (1998) analyzed predation risk among 121 different cercopithecoid primate popu-
lations and found that predation risk was higher in larger groups relative to smaller groups,
suggesting that larger groups are more easily detectable by predators. Why then, would
increased risk of being spotted by a predator be favored? This is because predation rate
is believed to be lower in larger groups than smaller groups, despite the higher frequency
of encounters with predators. To clarify, predation rate is the frequency at which preda-
tors successfully attack a group or group member and predation risk is the likelihood of a
predator encounter under natural conditions (Hill & Dunbar, 1998). Isbell (1994) found a
negative relationship between predation rate and group size in mouse lemurs, suggesting
that larger groups indeed helped maintain a lower rate of successful attacks by predators.
Hill and Dunbar (1998) have suggested however, that there is not a significant relationship
between predation rate and group size in most studies conducted on diurnal species.
Trivers (1971) suggested that once groups form, social behaviour must enhance the
original benefits of group living. Group living decreases the odds of a particular individual
being predated on over all other members. Living in solidarity means if a predator detects
an individual there is no one else the predator will select. Predation risk is lower for any
particular individual in a group because other members act as decoys that the predator could
select (Hamilton, 1971). Groups also enhance predator vigilance by means of increasing
the number of individuals who could locate predators. This is especially effective in an-
imals with evolved alarm calling systems that function to warn other members of nearby
predators.
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2.2 Historical Theories of Communication in Non-Human
Animals
Our understanding of communication systems in all animals, including humans, is not
well established and attempting to explain how animals communicate with one another
has produced many theories from a variety of disciplines. Early ethological approaches
dominated the study of animal behaviour until the middle of the 20th century with Darwins
ideas being the catalyst for how ethnologists, such as Lorenz and Tinbergen, approached
the study of animal behaviour. Prior to the 1970s it was understood that signals produced by
non-human animals evoked a motivational or emotional response in others. Peter Marler
was among those to first challenge the traditional dogma as well as assess the structure-
function relationship of non-human animal signals. Marlers work led to the discovery of
a referential system in a non-human primate population and the birth of the revolutionary
informational theories that greatly impacted the future studies of non-human animals.
2.2.1 Early Ethological Theories in Animal Communica-
tion
Darwin (1871) suggested that the function of communication systems in animals was to
convey information about emotional or motivational states. What intrigued Darwin about
social animals was the maladaptive behaviours and expressions that existed despite the
considerable consequences that reduced an individuals fitness and chances of survival. The
theory of sexual selection, proposed by Darwin (1871) to explain how traits that were
exaggerated or showy, such as a bright colours or loud mating calls, were selected for
because these traits enhanced reproductive success of the individual. The catch of course
being that the exaggerated traits also attract more predators, thus pining sexual selection at
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odds with natural selection (Darwin, 1871). Dawkins (2006) describes sexual selection as
maintaining individually maladaptive traits in social groups because it provides a mating
advantage and those who had a mating advantage, were more fit in terms of reproductive
success.
The fathers of ethology, Konrad Lorenz and Nikolaas Tinbergen adopted Darwins think-
ing that communication was an expression of motivational states. In avian species, Lorenz
(1966) studied the material response by mothers towards their young offspring that devel-
oped during imprinting stages of development. Tinbergen conducted research on stickle-
back fish, finding that males were instinctively more aggressive towards wooden models
that displayed more red on its underside than a real male fish (Tinbergen, 1952). Tinber-
gens main premise was that more exaggerated stimuli, or supernormal stimuli, that elicited
more of a particular response than the normal stimuli would. Tinbergen (1953) also found
that gulls could be made to prefer artificial eggs over their own. Around the same time, Karl
von Frisch discovered a unique communication system in honeybees. Von Frisch (1950,
1967) suggested that honeybee expressed information about the location of food sources to
one another through different types of dances.
Darwin, Lorenz, Tinbergen and von Finch also acknowledged animal signals as be-
haviour that benefited other members of the group. In other words, these ethologists took
the stance that natural selection for animal signal were observed at the level of the group.
Proponents of group selection believed that the function of communication was to improve
survival of the group at the expense of individual fitness (Hauser, 1996). For example,
alarm calls benefit the group as a whole by alerting the other members of a predator threat,
despite increasing ones susceptibly to predation. The problem is explaining why individu-
als would engage in behaviours that put them at risk. In fact, individuals who dont call go
unnoticed by predators and should be more likely to survive. In reality, the fittest individu-
als are selfish, dont call and increase their chances of survival over those who do (Dawkins,
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2006).
In contrast to group selection, gene (or individual) selection suggests that genes, metaphor-
ically, promote their own survival and propagation in future generations over what is best
for other group members (Dawkins, 2006). Hamilton (1963, 1964) was the first to suggest
that cooperative social behaviour was a means to enhance an individuals inclusive fitness -
the direct (mating) or indirect (protecting kin) behaviours that enhancing genetic propaga-
tion. Not all social situations are cooperative and individuals within a group interact with
each other, even if they are not related. Non-relatives are individuals that stand in the way
of ones goals to pass on its genes to subsequent generations. Selection would then favor in-
dividuals who could manipulate other individuals within a group. Smith and Price (1973)
used game theory to explain the dynamics of all competitive interactions over resources
within a population (Smith, 1976, 1977, 1982). Smith and Price described an evolutionary
stable strategy occurred in a population when a strategy, that could not bested by an alter-
native strategy, was adopted by most members of the population. Thus, the best strategy for
an individual depends on the nature of competing strategies (Dawkins, 2006). In aggressive
conflicts there are two strategies: fight or flee. There are payoffs and costs when choosing
a strategy and the population must consist of members that would chose fighting as well as
members that would choose fleeing. It is impossible to maintain a system of only fighters
or only fleers because a deviant individual who adopts the wrong strategy would be a great
advantage in manipulating other members. A stable society must have both individuals
who will fight in aggressive situations and those who will flee. Once a population reaches
a stable balance of fighters and fleers, the average payoff for fleeing and fighting will be
mutual (Smith, 1976, 1977, 1982).
During the 1970s researchers began to move away from the view that signals accurately
promoted ones emotions and motivations (Hauser, 1996). During competition, communi-
cation functioned to increase ambiguity of emotional states. Zahavi (1975, 1977) intro-
10
duced the handicap principle - that signals are only honest if they come at a cost to callers.
However, these costs would not be as costly in other individuals with less of that particular
trait. Zahavis theory accounts for some of the more exaggerated traits that would also at-
tract predation as a side effect, such as loud mating calls or bright colours. Because these
traits exist, individuals that display themmust be able to cope with, or compensate for, these
handicaps. In turn, females will be more attracted to such features because these features
indicate high quality partners (Zahavi, 1975, 1977, 1987). An example that demonstrates
Zahavis handicap principle is given by the Tungara frog (Physalaemus pustulosus). Selec-
tion might favor the frogs that advertise best their ability to survive. Typically, Tungara
frogs have a whine vocalization but some frogs also display a louder, chuck mating call
as well. Females appear to be more attracted the frogs that express wine and chuck calls,
perhaps because their louder chucks show an ability to thrive despite a more costly mating
call (Ryan, 1990; Ryan & Rand, 1993; Endler & Basolo, 1998).
Perhaps the most promising alternative to the early ethological approaches to commu-
nication was outlined by (Dawkins & Krebs, 1978). Adopting the logic of game theory,
they suggested that the function of signals during competitive interactions was to manipu-
late the behaviour of receivers. The manipulation framework was significant to the study
of animal behaviour because it provided the first argument that signals were designed to
change the behaviour in others, rather than merely inform or deceive others about the sig-
nalers intent. At first, Dawkins and Krebs theory was criticized for being signaler-centred
and not accounting for communication in highly cooperative species (Van Rhijn & Vodegel,
1980; Hinde, 1981). Krebs and Dawkins responded by acknowledging that receivers would
evolve to be good mind readers (Krebs & Dawkins, 1984; Hauser, 1996). In other words
there are two parties participating in communication: the signaler, whose intent is to ma-
nipulate receivers, and the receiver, whose intent is to try an accurately tell whether or not
the signalers expressions are accurate and ignore them if they perceive deception (Krebs &
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Dawkins, 1984).
Most of the research conducted prior to the 1970s was directed at how animals ex-
pressed emotion and motivation states to others or, in the case of manipulation, how sig-
nalers could manipulate the emotional states of receivers. Any comparison made to human
signals did not extend beyond the level of emotion. No one viewed animal signals as re-
quiring higher-order cognition because non-human animals have less developed neocortical
regions of the brain relative to humans (Marler et al., 1992). The honeybee dance in many
ways appears to function as if it provides information about the location of a food source
is being transmitted from signaler to receiver, in much the same way that humans convey
arbitrary messages to one another. However, the structure-function relationships are funda-
mentally different. Apart from other considerations, there is no homological relationship
between the two very different signaling systems (Hauser, 1996).
2.2.2 Structure and Function of Animal Communication
Prior to the 1980s, the predominant view in non-human animal communication was that an-
imal signals primarily reflected changes in arousal or motivation in listeners (Smith, 1977).
In contrast to other animals, humans were considered to have the unique ability to do more
than express affect. Human language uses complex, arbitrary symbols to refer to objects
and events in the world. An example would be how humans can think and communicate
about referents, such as food or hunger, outside an immediate context where food is present
or they are hungry. The view was that non-human animals could only naturally vocalize
indirectly about referents in context-appropriate situation,s via the expression of the com-
municators internal state (Smith, 1977). In fact, only captive apes and gorillas provided
any indication that they could be taught by humans to use signs to communicate (Gardner
& Gardner, 1969; Premack, 1970; Rumbaugh, Gill, & von Glasersfeld, 1973; Patterson,
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1978; Terrace, 1979) whereas apes in the wild did not do so (LawGoo1968, Fos1972).
Early ethological approaches primarily focused on the functional aspects of non-human
animal signals and how they compared to human language. To Darwin (1871), Lorenz
(1966), and Tinbergen (1952) animal signals were non-arbitrary expressions of the sig-
nalers motivational and emotional states. Peter Marler was the first ethologist to extend
this in his analyses of the structure-function relationship of non-human animal signals.
Marler (1956) showed that chaffinches used structurally different alarm calls (warning and
mobbing calls) in different contexts, which functioned to produce different responses in
other chaffinches. The function of warning calls was alert other members of a predator
threat that required fleeing action, whereas mobbing calls functioned to localize members
and mob the predator threat.
Marlers research on the structure-function relationship in avian species was later redi-
rected to primate vocalizations. Thomas Struhsaker (1967b) first observed that vervet mon-
keys in Kenya used three distinct alarm calls for three different types of predators. Each
alarm call-predator type pairing was associated with a different escape and vigilance re-
sponse by other members of the group. A sharp tonal bark given to land predators, such
as leopards, provoking other vervets to run up a tree and look towards the ground. Low-
pitched, staccato grunt calls were given to avian predators and hearing this call would
elicit running into cover and scanning upwards for potential avian predators by other group
members (Struhsaker, 1967c; Seyfarth et al., 1980a, 1980b). Finally a chutter call, given
to snakes and usually produced by females and juveniles, evoked mobbing responses in
others, presumably to prevent surprise attacks (Struhsaker, 1967b). Vervet monkeys are
uncommonly exposed to a variety of different predator types, virtually leaving vervets with
no place to be safe from all predator attacks. Natural forces could select for a commu-
nicative design that warned other members, not only of a predator attack, but a specific
predator attack. One general alarm call for all predator types wouldnt provide an efficient
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survival strategy because escaping one predator type could mean being exposed to another
predator type (Hauser, 1996). Marler (1967) was the first to suggest that the association be-
tween different alarm calls and stereotypical responses towards certain predators appeared
to show the semantic features thought to be unique to human languages (Lancaster, 1967;
Marshall, 1970).
Approximately 10 years after Struhsakers work (1967b), Marler sent out Robert Sey-
farth and Dorothy Cheney to verify experimentally the potential for semantic, or referential,
communication. To do so, they augmented the earlier observational work with playback ex-
periments on the same Amobseli vervet population that had been studied by (Struhsaker,
1967b). Seyfarth et al. (1980a, 1980b) hypothesized that, if vervet monkeys displayed
the stereotypical responses towards different alarm calls presented to them in the absence
of predators, then the vocalizing vervets would be communicating using referential com-
munication. The results of their playback experiments indeed demonstrated that after the
presentation of different playback alarm calls, vervet monkeys responded appropriately in
the absence of predators Seyfarth et al. (1980a, 1980b). Seyfarth and Cheney concluded
that the stereotypical responses were not induced by changes in arousal, but rather by the
meaning of the call. For example, when amplitude of the different alarm call types was
controlled for, the stereotypical responses remained . Seyfarth et al. concluded that vervet
monkeys were using arbitrary signals to communicate the presence of a particular predator
in their environment (Seyfarth et al., 1980a, 1980b).
2.3 Informational Theories of Communication
The rudimentary referential alarm calls of the vervet monkeys changed the perception that
vocalizations merely reflected changes in affective states. Marler (1977) first suggested
that vervet monkey alarm calls represented a rare case of non-affective communication
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and the playback experiments conducted by Seyfarth et al. (1980a, 1980b), at the time,
confirmed his hypothesis. These findings were revolutionary because it was previously held
that humans were the only species capable of semantic communication. Further evidence
of the context specificity of the alarm calls came from a follow-up study by Cheney and
Seyfarth (1988), that showed that vervet monkeys stop responding to the alarm calls of
particular individuals whose recorded calls are were presented frequently in the absence
of predators. No responses after false alarm calls by a member of the group suggest that
not only is context important for referential communication, but also that memory of prior
instances plays a key role in determining whether another member is being honest (Owings
& Morton, 1998).
Communication took on a whole new look after Marlers early work with avian and
primate animals. Green and Marler (1979) defined communication as the transmission of
information from one animal to another. Information is encoded by one individual into a
signal and when received by another animal, this information undergoes decoding, while
still retaining a specifiable relationship to the encoded information. This definition clearly
gives more responsibility to higher cognitive process and moves away from the traditional
ideas that communication merely reflects changes in affective states. Animals appear to
also convey information about contextual and emotional states. Marlers work, along with
that of his colleagues, gave way to informational perspectives that have influenced much of
the research conducted in animal communication over the past 30 years.
Seyfarth et al. (1980a, 1980b) adopted the informational hypothesis when they conclud-
ing that vervet monkey alarm calls were evidence that a form of referential communication
could exist in non-human animals. They importantly acknowledge that these alarm calls are
not exactly like human words; a leopard alarm call doesnt mean leopard in the same sense
that humans use the word leopard. Instead, early informational theories characterizes ani-
mal signaling as a process in which the signaler generates and encodes information about a
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particular stimulus in their environment and conveys this information to a receiver(s) who,
in turn, relies on evolved neural and perceptual processes to decode and recover this infor-
mation (Green & Marler, 1979). Early informational approaches have been criticized for
failing to define constructs like information and encoding. (Owren & Rendall, 2001; Ren-
dall et al., 2009; Owren, Rendall, & Ryan, 2010), since the suggestion that calls carried
encoded information put biological constructs secondary to linguistic constructs. This is
problematic because what it is exactly that is encoded as information is left unknown. Con-
structs like reference or semanticity are, for Owren and Rendall (2001), merely metaphors
referring to encoded information.
Owren and Rendall (2001) pointed out that early informational approaches were at odds
with the evolutionary principles like gene selection and the selfish gene principle. For ex-
ample, alarm calls produced by signalers were believed to function to enhance the survival
of other group members. As stated earlier, however, it would be the individuals who refrain
from calling that hold the advantage over callers because they would not be located as easily
by predators (Dawkins, 2006). Kin selection and altruism are not highlighted as principles
of early informational theories, thus leaving no explanation for why apparently altruistic
alarm calls that contain information about a potential predator threat exist Owren and Ren-
dall (2001). Although Seyfarth et al. (1980a) acknowledge that acoustic features are likely
to play a partial role in eliciting responses towards different predators (i.e. without arousal,
there would be no panic responses at all to any predator) the majority of the effect is a con-
sequence of higher cognitive processing. In other words, informational approaches do not
describe the relationship of the acoustical properties of alarm calls and their function. Sug-
gesting that there is no relationship between the morphology of different alarm calls and
the stereotypical responses is taking a giant step away from the processes that govern the
majority of animal expressions. It is not impossible think that different alarm calls could
simply be conditioned to different responses, much like how many animal vocalizations are
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developed over generations.
Informational approaches are also problematic in that they turn evolution on its head
(Owren & Rendall, 2001; Rendall et al., 2009; Owren et al., 2010). One important princi-
ple of evolution is that it works through the modification of existing characteristics (Hall,
2003). For example, the evolution of bipedalism is best approached by examining the re-
lationship of structural and functional characteristics of bipedal locomotion and ancestral
quadrupedal locomotion in common ancestors. Instead, informational perspectives exam-
ine the language-like properties animal signals without providing morphological and neu-
roanatomical evidence in any common ancestors (Owren et al., 2010). Unfortunately, the
mechanisms involved in human language and all other non-human animal communication
are distinct, whereas parallels to other communicative designs in common ancestors would
be more sensible (Owren et al., 2010). For example there are no shared mechanisms in
honeybee dancing and human language as they share no common ancestors (Von Frisch,
1950, 1967). As humans share many ancestral characteristics to primates, it is quite entic-
ing to look for similarities in human and non-human primate communication. Both humans
and many primate species are very social creatures and have higher brain sizes than should
be expected given their body size (Passingham, 1981). However the brain structures of hu-
mans and other primates are still very different. Human language goes beyond stimulating
the subcortical, emotional regions of the brain. Human language activates the prefrontal
cortex regions of the brain along with the subcortical regions (Lieberman, 2002). Stud-
ies have shown that when non-human primates communicate, mostly only the subcortical
regions of the brain are stimulated, indicating that animal communication is not really
human-like (Radick, 2005).
Referential communication had a great impact on animal communication in the years
following the Amboseli playback study. However, it had becoming increasing evident that
animal signals were still strikingly different from human words. Informational theories
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decided to modify the definition of referential communication rather than abandon it all
together. Functional referentiality was adopted as a term in order to distinguish the features
of non-human communication from those of human language (Hauser, 1996). Functionally
referential signals are context-specific signals, which elicit the same response as the referent
for which the signal stands, even in its absence (Evans, 1997). The purpose of adopting
functional referentiality was to abandon the idea of intentional signaling via the encoding
of information while maintaining the idea that signals had independent meaning (Cheney
& Seyfarth, 1996). However, informationalists still hold that functional referential signals
require higher cognitive processes and are closer to human language than any other form
of communication in non-human animals (Marler et al., 1992).
The informational perspectives attribute higher cognitive processes, though not always
specified, as an explanation for animal signals. Informational perspectives, as outlined
above, have come under scrutiny, and opposing perspectives have gained as much atten-
tion over the last two decades as the informational perspectives. (Marler, 1977) began to
move away from the idea that animal signals only elicited affective responses in receivers.
Around the same time that Seyfarth et al. (1980a, 1980b) were uncovering the referen-
tial alarm calls of vervet monkeys, (Dawkins & Krebs, 1978) were arguing that signals
functioned to manipulate receivers, with the receivers objective being to resist (Krebs &
Dawkins, 1984). The two perspectives carry different expectations. Referential communi-
cation requires that signals benefit the receiver along with the signaler. A battle between
manipulative signalers and resisting receivers, on the other hand, is the selfish behaviour
that is expected from two animals with divergent fitness interests (Owren et al., 2010). Re-
ceivers learning to ignore manipulative signals would force signalers to become honest,
at least some of the time, creating an environment with a wide array of communicative
interactions.
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2.4 Influence over information: The affect-induction ap-
proach
Many researchers believe that terms like information and encoded information cloud our
understanding of animal communication. Though there have been many criticisms of the
informational theories, textbooks still refer to vervet alarm calls as being like human words
as if the definition of communication proposed by Green and Marler (1979), is still accu-
rate today. Metaphorical comparisons of human words to animal vocalizations that appear
representational do not highlight any underlying morphological or physiological mecha-
nisms involved in producing and responding to vocalizations. Informational definitions are
susceptible to conflating information with meaning, in turn producing indefinable, non-
measurable constructs. Since 1980, researchers have been propelled towards analyzing
higher cognitive processes in animals with semantic like signals rather than focus on the
acoustic characteristics of vocalizations or the sensory systems at play when vocalizations
are produced and heard (Owren & Rendall, 2001; Rendall et al., 2009; Owren et al., 2010).
Owren and Rendall have proposed that the current definition of communication needs
to move away from loosely defined terms such as information, encoding, decoding and rep-
resentation. They suggest that communication is better described as specialized, species-
typical morphology or behaviour [selected] to influence the current or future behaviour of
another individual (Owren et al., 2010). A definition based on influence instead of informa-
tion appropriately incorporates all communicative circumstances, whether it be in cooper-
ative situations, such a courtship calls or predator calls, or competitive circumstances, such
as aggressive encounters. This affect-induction (Owren & Rendall, 2001) approach is very
similar to the definition proposed by (Krebs & Dawkins, 1984). Instead of signalers manip-
ulating receivers, the affect-induction account proposes that signalers influence a response
in receivers (Owren & Rendall, 2001; Rendall et al., 2009; Owren et al., 2010).
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A major advantage of the affect-induction approach is that affect and emotional re-
sponses abide by the principles of evolution. Affect-induction is explicitly signaler-centered
whereas the informational approaches are largely assuming social behaviour resulted from
cooperative evolution where signalers shared encoded information with others (Owren &
Rendall, 2001). When signalers are influencing the behaviours of receivers, they always
benefit. Receivers can benefit, but not in all circumstances. In other words, the affect-
induction proponents would state that vocalizations do not function to benefit receivers. In
fact, (Owren et al., 2010) suggest that vocalizations that benefit receivers are likely to be
secondary consequences of other evolved perceptual mechanisms. For example alarm calls
may have evolved as a secondary behaviour following the pairing of stereotyped escape re-
sponses with particular predators. If the limbic system produces different states of arousal
to different predators because it provided a better strategy to escape that particular preda-
tor, then it is not impossible that different sounds would also become paired with these
particular predator-response associations. In fact, affective accounts do not attribute higher
cognitive mechanisms that would be required for referential communication and suggest,
instead, that different signal designs influencing affective responses in other individuals
become paired via conditioning. To make referential-like animal signals more affect-based
puts these signals on par with other evolved conditioned behaviours in animals. Instead
of introducing higher cognitive mechanisms into animal communication, signals can now
be viewed like most other animal behaviours that are governed by sensory and emotional
processes.
When you analyze the acoustic structure and subsequent responses of mating calls, it
is evident that these calls need not contain encoded information about a particular mates
fitness that must be decoded by females. For example, the chuck mating call of the Tungara
frog may be favored because whine calls were insufficiently audible against background
noise (Ryan, 1990). Male Tungara frogs are the only species of frog in its clade to produce
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the chuck call and it is extremely effective in attracting mates, including those from other
frog species. It has been suggested that two organs of the Tungara frogs ear are sensitive to
different calls, a trait characteristic of many anuran species (Gerhardt & Schwartz, 2001).
The amphibian papilla is sensitive to whines and the basilar papilla is more sensitive to
chucks, a sensory design that males can be selected to exploit in females (Ryan & Rand,
2003). This is further evidence that signalers clearly benefit. Although females appear
to benefit this may be a derived effect of the evolution of the anuran sensory systems.
Receivers can become habituated to vocalizations and therefore learn to stop responding
to calls that induce less of a physiological response. Even vocalizations that appear to be
arbitrary at first, such as the vervet monkey alarm calls, are clearly anything but. To evoke
any kind of response in in listeners, there must be an affective response that precedes an
escape response.
2.5 History of playback experiments
Prior to Seyfarth and Cheneys initial playback experiment on vervet monkeys there was
only a small sample of playback experiments conducted on other animals. Garner (1891,
1892) is best known for being the first to use a playback experiment while studying simian
vocalizations and their relationship to human words. A notable playback program that pre-
ceded the 1980s was Huxley and Koch (1938) work in which they recorded and played back
the vocalizations of mandrill, mangabey, and baboons and assessed how they responded. At
much the same time Carpenter (1941) conducted playbacks on gibbons in Thailand. At the
same time, it was clear that playbacks were not being used as a primary tool for studying
animal communication and the meaning of animal signals (Radick, 2005).
Vervet monkeys not only became the public face of language-like calls and referential
communication but also opened the door for the use of playback experiments to analyze the
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meaning of animal vocalizations. With the technology for the time, Seyfarth and Cheney
experiment demonstrated that playback studies could be conducted in an animals natural
environments and provide a useful means to assess the effects of animal vocalizations out-
side appropriate contexts (i.e. alarm calls in the absence of a predator). They did more
than just assess vervet monkey alarm call for the potential of referential communication.
Using playbacks, Cheney and Seyfarth (1982) showed that different grunts produced by
vervet monkeys evoked different responses that were dependent on the acoustic properties
of each grunt. Cheney and Seyfarth reported that the different responses to different grunts
were more subtle than the different responses following alarm calls, but still significant
enough for them to suggest that they pointed to rudimentary referential communication
(Cheney & Seyfarth, 1982). Cheney and Seyfarth (1985) also used playback studies to
verify Dawkins and Krebs hypothesis that animals signals functioned to manipulate others
(Dawkins & Krebs, 1978; Krebs & Dawkins, 1984). Following playbacks to alarm calls,
lower ranking vervets appeared to have withheld alarm calls when in the presence of high-
ranking individuals more often than high-ranking individuals withheld calls after spotting
predators. This hypothesis was more difficult to confirm in their early experiments, even
on captive groups. In another study, Cheney and Seyfarth (1988) assessed signal habitua-
tion and whether vervets learned to ignore intergroup chutters and alarm calls from vervets
that consistently vocalized at inappropriate times. This study was also important because it
contrasted acoustically different vocalizations, their apparent functions and whether habit-
uation occurred across one call or all calls from a particular individual. As with previous
research on vervet vocalizations, they provided evidence that the information was under-
stood at the semantic level when vervets learned that certain contexts, alarm calls do not
always provide reliable information, such as when a vervet constantly cries wolf (Cheney
& Seyfarth, 1982; Owings & Morton, 1998).
Work on squirrels that followed the Amboseli playback experiment, found mixed evi-
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dence for referential communication. Belding squirrels (Spermophilus beldingi) (Robinson,
1980, 1981) and California ground squirrels (Spermophilus beecheyi) (Owings & Hen-
nessy, 1984) both responded to flying raptors with a high sense of urgency relative to the
low urgency responses elicited by terrestrial predators. Owings, Hennessy, Leger, and
Gladney (1986) reported that, in terms of responding to terrestrial and rattlesnake predators,
the function of alarm calls was to warn vulnerable offspring. For mammalian predators, it
appeared that only alarm calls that were non-repetitive calls functioned as warning alarm
calls. Consequently, Greene and Meagher (1998) reported that red squirrels have acous-
tically distinct predator alarm calls. Seet calls were produced towards aerial predators
and bark calls were produced mostly towards terrestrial predators. However these stud-
ies didnt conduct playback experiments and therefore did not establish whether calls were
truly referential or urgency based. Playback experiments on Colombian ground squirrels
(Urocitellus columbianus) have provided evidence that recorded vocalizations are context
specific. Harris, Murie, and Duncan (1983) concluded from playbacks that hollow chirps
function to elicit attention in others, but not in an alarm circumstance, while shrill chirps
function as predator alarm calls.
The emergence of playback experiments on other primate species became apparent in
the 1990s. Macedonia (1990) conducted a similar playback study on ring-tailed (Lemur
catta) and ruffed lemurs (Vavecia varieata), both of which are known for having distinct
terrestrial and aerial alarm calls. His results indicated that ring-tailed lemurs could distin-
guish between terrestrial and aerial predators. Ringtailed lemurs looked up and locomoted
bipedally when hearing an aerial alarm call, and ran up trees before looking down after ter-
restrial alarm calls were emitted, even in the absence of the predators. Thus, the ring-tailed
lemurs did appear to respond referentially towards aerial and terrestrial alarm calls. On the
other hand, ruffed lemurs did not do so. Their most common response to either alarm call
was to look in the direction of the speaker, rather than scan for a particular predator and
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responses that did occur to alarm calls were based on level of perceived threat, rather than
type of predator (Macedonia, 1990).
Along with his colleagues, influential primatologist Klaus Zuberbhler and colleagues
have studied primate communication in Diana and Campbells monkeys. Males of both
species respond to alarm calls of aerial and terrestrial predators stereotypically. Zuberbu¨hler,
Noe¨, and Seyfarth (1997) discovered that Diana monkeys (Cercopithecus diana) produce
distinct calls towards leopard and aerial predators. After conducting playback experiments
on male Diana monkeys, the apparent function of the alarm calls appeared to be to warn
others of a particular predator threat and communicate the detection of a predator. Female
and male Campbells monkeys (Cercopithecus campbelli) produce vocalizations in different
contexts from each other (Ouattara, Lemasson, & Zuberbu¨hler, 2009b, 2009a). Ouattara,
Zuberbu¨hler, N’goran, Gombert, and Lemasson (2009) compared predator specific alarm
calls of captive female to wild female Campbells monkeys and found that only wild mon-
keys produced predator specific alarm calls. Their playback experiment was not typical of
other playbacks in that they played recordings of leopard growls and eagle shrieks, along
with presenting leopard, eagle and python mounts in order to compare females responses
to all five predator situations. Females produced three types of calls (hoks, wak-oos and
RRA calls) in predator situations. Furthermore, there were a variety of RRA calls that were
distinguishable and context-specific. For example, (Ouattara, Lemasson, & Zuberbu¨hler,
2009b) observed that RRA4 calls are primarily given towards leopard and snake predators
and RRA3 calls being given, along with hoks and wak-oos, to crowned eagles. Though
the authors believe these calls could be referential, a playback experiment that measures
the different responses towards calls needs to be done in the absence of the particular con-
text. Finally, urgency models were supported by the fact that females respond with more
urgency towards visual encounters with predators, rather than audible playbacks of aerial
predators.
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There have been plenty of playback experiments conducted over the last 30 years, many
of which were aimed as assessing the potential for referential communication in non-human
animals. Playback experiments conducted on suricates (Suricata suricatta) by Manser,
Bell, and Fletcher (2001) found that they responded differently to the alarm calls of aerial
predators than they did to land predator alarm calls. Suricates also responded differently
based on level of urgency in the alarm calls. Manser concluded that suricates were retriev-
ing information about the type of predator and urgency of the call from the different alarm
calls from the alarm calls. As Mansers experiment shows, it is clear that it is not possible
obtain all the answers about animals communication based solely on playback experiments,
but they are very useful tools for assessing animal behaviour, nonetheless. With technology
becoming increasingly advanced, tools like playbacks will surely continue enhance our un-
derstanding of what is evidently one of the most convoluted areas of study. Remarkably,
given its canonical importance and the extensive research on other taxa that the Seyfarth et
al. (1980a, 1980b) study spawned (Beynon & Rasa, 1989; Evans et al., 1993; Zuberbu¨hler,
2000), their work on vervets has not been replicated; although a recent study on the closely-
related green monkey (Chlorocebus sabaeus) has dealt with some of the issues that arise
from the original work (Price & Fischer, 2013).
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Chapter 3
Methods
3.1 Study Animals and Site
Data were collected between July 2011 and June 2012 from two groups of wild vervet
monkeys (Riverside Troop, RST, and RiverbendMob, RBM) at in the Samara Private Game
Reserve in the Eastern Cape, South Africa (Pasternak et al. 2012; Henzi et al. 2013). Troop
sizes were: NRST⇠=70 and NRBM⇠=55 at the beginning of the study period and NRST⇠=60 and
NRBM⇠=35 at the end of the period. The decline in numbers was a consequence largely of
predation (unpublished data), although pulses of male migration were also a factor. Study
animals were fully habituated to the presence of human observers (i.e., they displayed
no visible behavioural or vocal response to the observers presence) and were individually
identifiable from natural markings.
3.2 Observational data collection
I collected observational data on a total of 262 days (NRBM =128; NRST = 134). Day length
varied over the year, given the high latitude of the site (Pasternak et al. 2012) but an average
of 10hrs/day was spent with study animals. Alarm calls were relatively infrequent during
this study: MeanTotal = 0.8 calls/day (MeanLand predator calls = 0.46/day; MeanAerial predator calls
= 0.25/day; MeanSnake calls = 0.07/day). As they could not be anticipated, I obtained obser-
vational data on the production and responses to calls by choosing at random a group of
visible animals within the group and following it for as long as at least one animal, which
may or may not have been in the group initially, was visible. When no animals were visi-
ble, I moved through the group until I found another animal or animals and followed them.
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When an alarm call was heard, I used a handheld datalogger (Trimble Juno), equipped with
proprietary software to record the first responses of all animals immediately in front of us,
their identities and age/sex class, as well as an estimate of their distance in metres from
the caller. Observers practiced estimating distance regularly, in order to ensure consistency
across different observers and to ensure an acceptable degree of accuracy. Estimates were
generally accurate to within 5m. Responses were categorised as context-appropriate or
context-inappropriate predator avoidance behaviour (in accordance with (Seyfarth et al.,
1980b) depictions: Table 3.1), as well as looks towards sound source and no observed re-
sponse. The protocol was also designed to capture predator-specific (vigilance appropriate
to the location of the predator, e.g., looking into the sky for aerial predators) and location-
specific vigilance (vigilance as determined by the location of the animal, e.g., an animal on
the ground may look up in response to a terrestrial predator call, but one sitting in a tree
would look down to the ground).
3.3 Recording of vocalizations
I obtained recordings of predator alarm calls both opportunistically and by presenting the
animals with a stuffed caracal, which is the primary predator at the study site, and a model
eagle owl. The monkeys responses to predator mounts resembled closely those of their
responses to the actual predators. Mounts were presented to both study troops (caracal:
NRST = 13, NRBM = 9; owl: NRST = 8, NRBM = 6) and, to reduce the possibility of habituation,
repeated presentations were limited to intervals of 14 days or longer. I recorded these calls
using a Marantz PMD661 digital recorder connected to a Sennheiser ME67 directional
microphone. Complete recordings, chosen for clarity, and recorded within a range of 1.5-
6m, were selected for the playback trials, and edited with the Audacity Audio editor to
produce either single unit (short) or multiple unit (long) calls. Short calls consisted of
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a single call unit, while long calls comprised, on average, four iterations of the call unit
(range: 2-7), excised as a subsection of a complete recording. Experimental long calls
matched natural calls both in the number of units (Meannatural= 4.0, Range: 2-7) and in their
duration (Meanexperimental = 0.62ms+/-0.25SD, Meannatural = 0.59ms +/-0.27SD).
Table 3.1: The frequency with which vervet monkeys responded with either appropriate
(N = 22) or inappropriate (N = 18) predator-avoidance behaviour in the 10s following the
experimental presentation of an alarm call. The number of animals that did not produce
predator-avoidance behaviour (N = 114) is also indicated.
3.4 Experimental procedure and analysis
To ensure comparability with Seyfarth et al. (1980a, 1980b) study, I followed their method
for experimental playback presentations. Prior to each trial, a Crate TX15 amplifier and
speaker was covered by a blanket and transported to the troops general location where it
was hidden behind cover ahead of the anticipated direction of travel by the troop, following
the procedure given in (Seyfarth et al., 1980a, 1980b). The digital recorder was used to
present the vocalisations, randomised across trials. With the exception of two single calls
(Table 3.2), each call was presented only once. As is common, in the absence of reference
sound pressure level measurements for each of the many calls, I used the independent
judgment of other fieldworkers to set appropriate playback volumes (see Seyfarth et al.
(1980a, 1980b)). Repetitions of each of the two calls used in more than one playback were
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broadcast at the same volume. The trial was timed to trade off the probability that the
available animals would veer off in another direction against the distance at which they
were from the speaker and likely to detect it. That is, if the approaching monkeys were
within 50m, but no longer moving towards the loudspeaker, or if they were closer than 20m
and appeared to be speeding up, I played the call. The mean distance of subjects at the
time of the trial was 32.03m (+/-15.44SD. Range: 15m-70m), which is a good match to
the mean distance at which subjects heard predator alarm calls during observational data
collection (30.1m +/-18.2m. Range: 4m-70m). Given that my aim with the experiments
was to corroborate my naturalistic observations, I thus did not fully replicate Seyfarth et al.
(1980a, 1980b), as their playbacks were conducted at a distance of 15m from the animals.
As I could not find any rationale or justification for the use of this distance reported in their
paper, I opted against the use of this distance in my study, and conducted playback trials
within the range actually experienced by my animals.
Table 3.2: Number of times an individuals playback was used (number of alarm calls that
were re-used in a second playback.)
Each troop was presented with land and aerial predator alarm calls recorded from one
of its members, after ensuring that the original caller was not in the vicinity, and, with the
exception of one aerial call and one land call that were used on more than one occasion,
each call was presented only once (see Table 3.2 for details). The bias towards male calls
reflects the fact that, in our population, females called far less frequently than males and
were never observed to produce the first alarm call in response to a predator. To control for
the effects of alarm call length on responses towards alarm calls, I used both long and short
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Table 3.3: Sex/Age of respondents to calls during playback trials and calls occurring natu-
rally.
alarm calls (see Seyfarth et al. (1980b)). I did not present the animals with snake calls or
chutters (Seyfarth et al., 1980a, 1980b). Although I have evidence that bites by venomous
snakes were responsible for fatalities, if not actual predation, snake calls were rarely heard
(⇠0.07/day) and field observations revealed that monkeys often did not call to snakes that
they saw. My subjective impression of these calls is that they were brief and soft.
I conducted a total of 62 trials (Table 3.3) and used digital video cameras to record re-
sponses, with one to four people conducting the filming on any one trial. I began recording
15 sec before the presentation of the call and continued for a minimum of 30sec after-
wards. The large inter-individual distances between animals meant that, unlike Seyfarth
et al. (1980a, 1980b), I did not wait until a minimum of five animals could be filmed and
simply obtained what data I could from visible subjects (mean = 2.42 +/-2.13 subjects/trial.
Range: 1-9). No two trials were conducted on the same troop within a 24hr period of the
previous playback presentation (MeanRBM = 2.8 days, Range: 1-7; MeanRST = 2.96 days,
Range: 1-10). Video recordings were subsequently scored independently by two people,
one of whom had not been at the field site, and who did so with reference to the defini-
tions of the relevant behaviours provided by (Struhsaker, 1967a) and Seyfarth et al. (1980a,
1980b).
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For the analysis of response times, I added data from the playback of other sounds to
serve as an additional control (N = 88 responses from 28 trials). These sounds included
human shouts (N = 8 trials), baboon barks (N = 5 trials), antelope barks (N = 2 trials),
bird calls (N = 6 trials) and vervet grunts (N = 7 trials). The baboon, antelope and bird
calls were either alarm calls or calls produced when the animals themselves are startled.
As such, they should also induce startle responses in perceivers, as they share some of the
acoustic features of vervet alarm calls. The same could perhaps be said of human shouts.
This means that, in addition to acting as controls, these calls also allow an assessment of
the affect-induction hypothesis.
3.5 Data extraction from videotaped responses to experi-
mental calls
Using the four categories outlined above, I identified the first response, if any, of each
animal to the calls that were played (see Table 3.1 for descriptions of context-appropriate
and inappropriate responses). The assessment of the outcomes of the original playback
experiments at Amboseli was based on the animals behaviour during the 10s following
the presentation of the call, with data extraction following a strict protocol (Seyfarth et al.
1980b). Following Seyfarth et al. (1980a, 1980b) and to facilitate more direct comparison,
I therefore also scored all identified predator-avoidance behaviours in the 10s that followed
the onset of each call. Startles in response to calls were defined as a sudden onset full or
upper body jerk, with a rapid movement of the head either upwards (if the animal had been
looking down) or to one side of the midline.
Inter-observer reliability in the scoring of different response categories was high (re-
sponses of animals on ground: kappa = 0.98, P < 0.001; responses of animals in trees:
kappa = 0.92, P < 0.001; estimates of visual scanning by subjects: kappa = 0.93, P <
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0.001).
3.6 Statistical Analyses
IBM SPSS statistics software, version 19 (SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL, U.S.A.) generated kappa
values for inter-observer reliability in the scoring of the video data. I used the melogit
and mixed procedures in Stata 13 to run appropriate multilevel generalised linear mixed
models on the response data, with logit link functions and binomial errors for the logistic
regressions and an identity link function and normal errors for the linear regression. In
each, animal identity (nested in Troop) was entered as a random effect in order to control
for repeated observations of some subjects. I used the log ratio (LR) test to compare models
and, when I do so, I also provide Akaike information criterion (AIC) values, where a lower
value suggests a better model fit. All tests are two-tailed, with alpha set at 0.05.
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Chapter 4
Results
4.1 First responses to natural predator alarm calls
Table 4.1: The responses of subjects to natural aerial (NRespondents = 70) and land (NRespondents
= 66) predator alarm calls, followed by responses to playbacks of aerial (NRespondents = 58)
and land (NRespondent = 96) predator calls. Responses that were neither appropriate nor
inappropriate according to the criteria were distinguished by whether the respondent did or
did not look towards the sound source.
I recorded 136 first responses to naturally occurring alarm calls. Of these, 17 were
classified as context-appropriate anti-predator responses, 15 as context-inappropriate re-
sponses, and 65 as looks towards caller. I could discern no response at all in 39 cases
and did not see any vigilance directed at the predator class indicated by the call (See Ta-
ble 4.1 for a full break-down of responses). These data, therefore, indicate the predicted
context-appropriate predator-avoidance response was not the most common response to
calls, nor did animals ever respond with context-appropriate predator-class vigilance. As
some animals contributed more than one datum, I assessed the extent of context-appropriate
anti-predator behaviour statistically with a binary logistic mixed model (appropriate re-
sponse versus inappropriate + no predator avoidance) with Troop as an independent con-
trol variable, Distance from the call as a covariate, and Animal Identity (nested in Troop)
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as a random effect. The results confirm that, in this environment, the absence of context-
appropriate predator avoidance was more common than its occurrence (Table 4.2A). This
model performed no better than the basal, intercept-only model (AIC = 106.46. LR test:
c222 = 3.14, P = 0.21).
To control for the observation that there is some acoustic variability in the calls given to
mammalian and avian predators (Struhsaker 1967; Seyfarth et al. 1980b; pers. obs.), and
to test the more conservative predictionthat calls will elicit at least some form of predator-
avoidance behaviour I combined appropriate and inappropriate responses (N=32) and re-
ran the logistic model (Table 4.2B). Here, I found that the probability of some form of
active anti-predator response, while still a minority response, was significantly more likely
if the alarm caller was closer to the respondent. This model performed better than the
intercept-only model (AIC = 150.4. LR test: c222 = 11.03, P = 0.004).
4.2 First responses to predator alarm call playback trials
The 62 experimental trials provided 154 individual responses, of which 22 were context-
appropriate predator avoidance actions, 18 were context-inappropriate, and 94 were di-
rected at the speaker. I could identify no response at all in 20 cases and did not observe
any context-appropriate vigilance directed at the predator class signified by the call (Table
4.1) These data thus confirm the results from the natural calls, demonstrating that context-
appropriate predator-avoidance was not the modal response, and that subjects did not re-
spond to calls with predator-appropriate vigilance. I repeated the same analyses that I ran
for first responses to natural calls and, with the exception of a significant constant, the out-
come of the assessment of context-appropriate versus context-inappropriate responses in
my experiments was the same as for natural calls, with distance having no effect (Table
4.3A). This model performed no better than the intercept-only model (AIC = 125.54. LR
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test: c222 = 4.74, P = 0.09)
Table 4.2: Mixed logistic regression model of (A) the probability that appropriate predator-
avoidance responses and (B) the probability that any defined predator-avoidance behaviour
were the first response to natural alarm calls. Troop identity was entered as an independent
variable and Distance as a covariate. Individual identity was entered as a random factor.
b+/-SE are coefficients and their associated SEs in logits. 95% confidence intervals (CI)
are derived from transformed odds-ratios.
As for natural calls, when I assessed the likelihood of some form of direct anti-predator
response to experimental calls (combining context-appropriate and context-inappropriate
responses) (Table 4.3B), I found a significant effect for Distance as well as for Troop. This
model performed significantly better than the intercept-only model (AIC = 169.3. LR test:
c222 = 17.8, P = 0.0001).
To investigate whether the latter was a consequence of differences between the troops
in their distance to the loudspeaker, I ran a full factorial model. The main effects model
(AIC = 155.5) performed as well as the full factorial model (AIC = 155.3. LR test: c221 =
2.24, P = 0.32), indicating that the difference in the responses of the two troops was due to
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the fact that animals in RST were more likely to respond to experimental calls with active
evasion of some kind, regardless of distance. Nevertheless, they still did so less than 50%
of the time.
Table 4.3: Mixed logistic regression model of (A) the probability that appropriate predator-
avoidance responses and (B) the probability that any defined predator-avoidance behaviour
were the first response to experimental alarm calls. Troop identity was entered as an inde-
pendent variable and Distance as a covariate. Individual identity was entered as a random
factor. b+/-SE are coefficients and their associated SEs in logits. 95% confidence intervals
(CI) are derived from transformed odds-ratios.
4.3 Comparison of first responses to natural and experi-
mental alarm calls
Figure 4.1 indicates that the modal first response to both natural and experimental calls was
to look at the sound source, with the absence of a detectable response as the second most
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frequent outcome. I tested the prediction that responses to natural and experimental calls
would not differ with a Response category that was broadened to include looks at sound
source. I entered the Age/Sex class (Adult Male, Adult Female, Juvenile) of respondents,
Troop Identity and Distance as general control variables and Distance*Response partly to
take into account the volume at which experimental calls were played, but also to investi-
gate the effect that distance had on call responses more generally. Animal Identity (nested
in Troop) was entered as a random effect. The final model (AIC: 381.72) performed better
than the base model (Responses only. AIC: 391.68. LR test: c227 = 23.9; P = 0.0012).
Nevertheless, with the exception of Troop ID (RST made a greater contribution to the
natural alarm call data set), no variables differed across contexts (Table 4.4). The same
outcome was obtained when the predator avoidance response was subdivided into context-
appropriate and context-inappropriate predator avoidance responses.
4.4 Comparison of responses produced during the 10s fol-
lowing a call
I ran a full factorial mixed logistic regression of the Samara data with Response (Appropri-
ate/Inappropriate) as the dependent variable. I conformed to the Amboseli analytical frame-
work by entering Call Type (aerial/land predator) and Respondent Location (ground/tree)
as independent variables, with Animal Identity entered as a random effect. Neither main
effect (zCall Type = -0.22, P = 0.83; zRespondent Location = 1.68, P = 0.09), nor their interaction (z
= -0.39, P = 0.69), was significant, nor was the model as a whole (Wald c223 = 3.58, P =
0.3).
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Figure 4.1: The relative frequency with which the first response of vervet monkeys to
natural (Grey bars. N = 136 animals) or experimentally-produced (Black bars. N = 154
animals) alarm calls was i. predator avoidance, ii. an absence of any detectable behaviour
or, iii. a stare in the direction of the sound source.
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4.5 Startle responses
Examination of the video data from the playback experiments indicated that 76.6% of first
responses to alarm calls were accompanied by startle responses. 88.7% of all looks toward
speaker responses included a startle as did, definitionally, all predator-avoidance behaviours
(see, for example, Figure 4.1). Here, it is important to emphasise that the startle and the
other actions occurred simultaneously. By comparison, only 36.3% (32/88) of control calls
resulted in animals looking towards the speaker and in no instance was the look accompa-
nied by a startle response. A mixed linear regression analysis with response time (ms) as
the dependent variable and Troop, Distance from loudspeaker and Response type (preda-
tor avoidance, look at loudspeaker with startle, look at loudspeaker without startle, control
response) as independent variables, with animal identity entered as a random factor, re-
vealed that responses to alarm calls that included a startle response were quicker than those
without. (Table 4.5. See Figure 4.2 for overlap in the 95% CI).
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Table 4.4: Mixed logistic regression model of the probability that Response type (predator-
avoidance, look towards call source and no apparent response) differed across Call contexts
(natural, experimental). The Distance of respondents to the call, Age/Sex class of respon-
dents (Adult male, Adult female, Juvenile) and Troop identity were included to control for
any general influence across Call context. The interaction between Distance and Response
type was included to control for the volume at which experimental calls were played. b+/-
SE are coefficients and their associated SEs in logits. 95% confidence intervals (CI) are
derived from transformed odds-ratios. Individual identity was entered as a random factor.
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Figure 4.2: The onset time (least square mean in seconds +/- 95%CI) of the first reactions
of vervet monkeys to those experimental presentation of alarm and control calls for which
a response was detected.
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Table 4.5: Mixed linear regression model of the probability that the time of onset of a
response to the presentation of an alarm call was a function of Troop, Distance from the
speaker and Response type (control, predator-avoidance behaviour, look at speaker with
startle, look at speaker without startle). b+/-SE are coefficients and their associated SEs in
logits. 95% confidence intervals (CI) are derived from transformed odds-ratios. Individual
identity was entered as a random factor.
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Chapter 5
Discussion
My observational and experimental results accord with each other, which gives me confi-
dence in the outcomes, but they deviate from prediction in two ways. First, the monkeys
in our groups never responded to predator alarm calls with context-appropriate, predator-
specific vigilance and rarely by initiating active predator avoidance. Second, even when
they did do so, there was no support for the prediction that alarm calls associated with each
of the two primary predator classes would trigger the context-appropriate behaviour spe-
cific to that predator. As such, these results make it difficult to assess the degree of stimulus
independence of the calls, given that there was no overt response, for the most part, to ei-
ther natural or experimental predator calls. I did, however, find support for the prediction
that distance from the caller/speaker would have a significant influence on the likelihood of
responding, supporting Wheeler (2010a, 2010b) suggestion that animals will be sensitive
to call proximity, with greater distance indicating a lower risk of predation to the perceiver.
Finally, I found that faster responses to predator calls were significantly associated with the
occurrence of startle responses, and that this was specific to vervet alarm calls, since the
alarm calls of other species were not associated with the production of startle responses.
In some respects, these findings do not deviate as widely from Seyfarth et al. (1980a,
1980b) findings as one might suspect. As Wheeler and Fischer (2012) have recently
pointed out, the textbook account of vervet alarm-call responding (where animals pro-
duce a highly specific, immediate and unvarying response to each call type) accords nei-
ther with Struhsaker (1967a) initial description, nor with the classic playback experiments
themselves, where subjects frequently responded in a context-inappropriate way to the call
types with which they were presented (Seyfarth et al. (1980b), Tables VII and VIII). In
fact, the argument for semantic content was not derived from the invariance of the animals
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responses; rather, the statistically significant appropriateness of responses was taken to in-
dicate semanticity, much as a word does. The word fire, for example, always has a referent,
but responses to its utterance can be expected to vary according to circumstance; in other
words, an influence of context on the animals response was implicit in the original work.
In this regard, it is important to note that Seyfarth et al. (1980a, 1980b) observed that their
subjects also frequently responded to alarm calls by scanning the environment and looking
towards the speaker, as if searching for additional cues (p. 802). That is, Seyfarth et al.
(1980a, 1980b) suggested that vervets responded to the potential semantic content of alarm
calls in the same kind of context-specific fashion as a person would to the shout of fire. This
being so, a test of their hypothesis does not require that animals produce a single invariant
response to each call each time it is heard, rather the monkeys response should be proba-
bilistic and reflect context; the association is therefore statistical, with a significantly higher
probability of responding with the appropriate escape response when exposed to a particu-
lar predator alarm call. On a descriptive level, then, my findings suggest that greater group
size in our population compared to Amboseli results in animals whose context-specific re-
sponse is to seek more information from their surroundings, rather than produce a reflexive
escape response (although, of course, I cannot exclude the possibility that there are other
differences in addition to group size that may account for this effect).
Why further information-seeking should occur is, however, an open question. One pos-
sibility is that, as Beauchamp and Ruxton (2007) show theoretically, larger group size in-
creases the rate of false alarms as animals respond mistakenly to innocuous stimuli, which
would then make it profitable for animals to seek further information before responding.
The greater dispersion of our study groups, and hence the greater average distance at which
calls are heard at Samara, may also be a factor here (⇠30m in both natural and experimental
contexts compared to 15m in experimental contexts at Amboseli), given the negative cor-
relation between call distance and active response. As increased inter-individual distances
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result in fewer close neighbours (as indexed here by the lower number of available subjects
in my trials), this may also reduce the likelihood of behavioural contagion (or response
facilitation: Hoppitt, Blackburn, and Laland (2007), which would otherwise be responsible
for a more uniform response across animals (i.e., animals respond to the behavioural re-
sponse of a conspecific rather than to the call itself, see e.g., Armstrong (1951)). While I
very rarely had the clusters of individuals that were common at Amboseli, I did once have
a group of nine animals in an experimental trial, all of which responded to the playback in
a synchronized textbook fashion (Figure 3). At the very least, this raises the prospect that
proximity increases the likelihood of contagious behaviour. Interestingly, a recent study
of grey kangaroos (Macropus giganteus) makes much the same case for a species that has
no alarm calls at all (Pays, Beauchamp, Carter, & Goldizen, 2013). However, if proxim-
ity can work in this fashion, it can also create, for the human observer, an impression of
independently triggered action driven directly by the call itself. An increase in contagion
in smaller groups is a hypothesis that can readily be tested, not only with the significantly
smaller groups living in non-riverine habitat at Samara (Pasternak et al., 2012), but also
in other vervet populations, where group sizes are smaller, as well as across different taxa
where group size is known to vary systematically.
Another possible factor is that an increase in distance of the perceiver from the caller,
as my results indicate, is also likely to reduce the perceived immediacy of any threat, pro-
ducing responses that are not unnecessarily disruptive to the perceiver (Wheeler, 2010a,
2010b). As a general rule, looking in the direction of the call may actually be the most
appropriate response because the caller or others in its vicinity might provide the best indi-
cator of the precise nature and severity of the threat and, therefore, the optimal response.
Group size and dispersion do not, however, explain the fact that, when our animals
did take evasive action, their responses were not significantly more likely to be context-
appropriate to the predator in question nor to the animals own location in space. Given
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Figure 5.1: A group of nine vervet monkeys (A) at the moment that the call is presented
to them from a distance of 29m and (b) 300ms later. Interlacing is visible in B because
images were extracted from a digital video recording.
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the similarity of experimental and natural responses, together with the fact that the modal
response to playbacks at any distance was a reflexive orientation of the head in the direction
of the sound source, it is not feasible to argue that the results are a consequence of my ex-
perimental procedure. One consideration, however, has to be that I did not use snake calls
in my trials (and rarely heard them during observational data collection). These calls are
soft and acoustically distinctly different, at least in comparison to the calls given to aerial
predators (Owren & Bernacki, 1988), and are elicited by snakes in the immediate vicinity
of the caller, and it is possible that these may trigger a more stereotyped response in nearby
animals. The inclusion of snake calls in the Amboseli study may therefore have contributed
more to the overall finding of predator-specific responding, whereas the response to terres-
trial and aerial predators may be inherently more variable, and more reliant on surrounding
context at the time the call is heard.
Recent work by Price and co-workers onWest African green monkeys is relevant in this
respect (Price & Fischer, 2013; Price, Ndiaye, Hammerschmidt, & Fischer, 2014). Price
et al. (2014) found, for example, that males terrestrial predator calls (leopard barks) were
also used in male-male competitive displays, suggesting greater variability in the use of this
call than originally proposed. In addition, Price and Fischer (2013) found that snake calls
were less likely than leopard calls to evoke appropriate responses. This goes against the
proposal that snake calls might be responsible for the differences I see between my results
and Amboseli, but it should be noted that no direct comparison with my study, nor with
Seyfarth et al. (1980a, 1980b), is possible here due to differences in methodology: Price
and Fischer (2013) used only female alarm chirps; they could not assess gaze direction due
to low visibility; and, most pertinently, used a prime-probe approach to test for context-
specificity. The real point here, though, is that there is variability in the degree to which
particular predator calls will evoke a context-appropriate response (see also Ca¨sar, Byrne,
Hoppitt, Young, and Zuberbu¨hler (2012)). Clearly, further work is needed, and is likely
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to be valuable and revealing. The absence of snake calls in my playback trials does not,
however, detract from the fact that Samara vervets fail to make the predicted discrimination
between terrestrial and aerial predator alarm calls.
Given that active behavioural responses to predators were not prevalent in my study, a
more comprehensive testing of how context influences vervet monkey responding, includ-
ing the kinds of affect such calls induce, might pay dividends (see e.g., Price and Fischer
(2013), Wheeler and Hammerschmidt (2013), Price et al. (2014)). While the modal re-
sponse to alarm calls was simply to look at the call source, it generally shared with active
evasion, but not with the response to control calls, its rapid, reflexive nature and a startle
response. This suggests that the increase in arousal generated by the call is an important
component of the overall predator response. In fact, if I see active evasion as a particularly
strong startle response, provoked by a high amplitude call at close quarters, then their un-
differentiated nature is not problematic. On the one hand, this fits with Owren and Rendall
(2001) argument that the concept of information as semantic content may simply be unnec-
essary: animals do not need to receive information that is encoded into a call, decode it and
then decide what to do with the information. Instead, the dimension of interest is signaled
directly, and entails a particular response, by virtue of call structure. On the other, the lack
of any startle response to control calls argues against this kind of straightforward interpre-
tation, given that it suggests that call structure alone is not sufficient to induce a startle.
Instead, it suggests that vervet alarm calls are more arousing than those of other species.
This could either be because, as per the original affect conditioning argument (Owren &
Rendall, 2001), an actual predator encounter is required for the call to acquire some form
of natural meaning (Scarantino, 2010) , and it is this association, and not the call alone, that
results in high levels of arousal and startle responses (Owren and Rendall 2001). Alterna-
tively (and this is not necessarily mutually exclusive), vervet alarm calls may be inherently
more arousing than the calls of other species, because they are more finely tuned to the
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vervets sensory system.
Overall, my results suggest that combining a clear and well defined notion of natural
meaning (Scarantino, 2010), with elements of the affect induction framework may be a pro-
ductive route to follow. This would, as Scarantino (2010) suggests, provide the precision
argued for by Rendall et al. (2009), by eradicating any sense that calls carry actual informa-
tional content, while preserving the idea that useful information can be picked up from the
reliable co-variance of calls and context. Animal communication can thus consider both
information and influence, as Scarantino (2010) and Wheeler and Fischer (2012) suggest,
without a slide into the inappropriate use of linguistic metaphors.
Regardless of the particular framework in which such investigations are conducted, it
seems obvious that much more observational and experimental research on vervets them-
selves is needed. In addition to a better sense of how different populations and Chlorocebus
taxa respond to alarm calls in relation to group size and habitat, there remains the unad-
dressed question, raised by both (Struhsaker, 1967a) and Seyfarth et al. (1980a, 1980b), of
the extent of call variability, both across age/sex classes and as given to particular predator
classes. In addition, knowing more about the function of such calls (i.e., do they serve to
deter or deflect a predator attack; warn kin; recruit other animals to mob) would help us
understand why multiple alarm calls exist in the first place. It also becomes interesting to
ask whether the benefits associated with alarm-calling can be achieved by perceivers if calls
cannot be treated as indicative of particular predator type. If we know more, we will then
be able to address properly the functional significance of the range of alarm calls available
to this species.
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